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VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN AN ADVERSARY 
SYSTEM 
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ABSTRACT 
  The victims’ rights movement argues that because the outcome of 
criminal prosecutions affects crime victims, the justice system should 
consider their interests during proceedings. In 2004, Congress passed 
the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA), giving victims some rights to 
participate in the federal criminal justice system. This Note probes 
both the theoretical assumptions and practical implications of the 
CVRA. It demonstrates that the victims’ rights movement revisits a 
long-acknowledged tension between adversary adjudication and 
third-party interests. It shows, however, that American law has 
resolved this tension by conferring party or quasi-party status on third 
parties. Despite some pro-victims rhetoric, Congress reaffirmed the 
public-prosecution model when it passed the CVRA. Instead of 
making victims parties or intervenors in criminal prosecutions, the 
CVRA asks courts and prosecutors to vindicate victims’ interests. This 
unusual posture creates substantial conflicts for courts and 
prosecutors and undermines defendants’ rights. To avoid these 
consequences, this Note argues, courts can interpret the CVRA’s 
substantive rights narrowly. Rather than reading the CVRA as 
conferring broad rights on crime victims, courts should interpret the 
statute to simply require institutional courtesy toward crime victims. 
This interpretation reflects victims’ nonparty status and preserves the 
rights and responsibilities of courts, prosecutors, and defendants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Marbury v. Madison1 Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “The 
province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, 
not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform 
duties in which they have a discretion.”2 Two centuries later, in 2004, 
Congress disrupted that division of power when it passed the Crime 
Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA),3 forcing courts both to step beyond 
deciding the rights of individuals and to second-guess executive 
discretion. With this statute, Congress may have transformed federal 
criminal prosecutions. 
Prior to the CVRA, for example, the prosecution of Dan Rubin 
for securities fraud would have been unremarkable. In March 2007, 
federal prosecutors and Rubin’s defense counsel negotiated a plea 
bargain, which the district court accepted.4 But two of Rubin’s 
victims, Dixie Chris Omni (Omni) and RJP Investment Company 
(RJP), did not like the plea agreement. Omni and RJP thought that 
Rubin should pay more restitution and prosecutors should provide 
more assistance with their civil suit against Rubin.5 In short, 
prosecutors wanted to resolve the case, but the victims wanted to 
recover their losses. 
Over the objection of the government and Rubin’s defense 
counsel, Omni and RJP petitioned the district court based on the 
CVRA to vacate the plea agreement and modify Rubin’s restitution 
order.6 They also argued that prosecutors violated their statutory 
right to be treated with respect when the government contended that 
Omni and RJP filed the petition merely to improve their bargaining 
position in the civil lawsuit.7 
 
 1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 2. Id. at 170. 
 3. Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn 
Crime Victims’ Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, tit. I, 118 Stat. 2260, 2261–65 (2004) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006) and to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10603(d)–(e)). This Note 
refers to the act simply as the Crime Victims’ Rights Act. 
 4. United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 441, 416 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 5. Id. at 412–13, 416–17. 
 6. Id. at 412–13, 425. Under the CVRA, victims may assert their statutory rights by 
petitioning the district court. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3). 
 7. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 416–17, 428; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8) (granting victims 
“[t]he right to be treated with fairness and with respect for [their] dignity and privacy”). 
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The district judge chafed at the victims’ request to second-guess 
the government and place their interests ahead of those of the parties. 
He refused to “prohibit[] the government from raising legitimate 
arguments . . . simply because the arguments may hurt a victim’s 
feelings.” 8 The court also expressed concern that “such a dispute . . . . 
potentially compromis[es] its ability to be impartial to the 
government and defendant, the only true parties to the trial.”9 
United States v. Rubin10 demonstrates the procedural and 
practical problems that the CVRA creates for participants in the 
federal criminal justice system. Traditionally, American courts have 
followed the adversary system of litigation, which grants parties broad 
autonomy to vindicate their rights and interests before an impartial 
court. The adversary system has informed the constitutional, 
procedural, and ethical rights and obligations of the system’s three 
primary participants: courts, prosecutors, and defendants. But 
because an adversary system relies on the parties to assert their 
interests before the court, it necessarily excludes outsiders like crime 
victims. 
The victims’ rights movement11 has argued that excluding victims 
from criminal proceedings is unjust because victims have a unique 
interest in the outcome of criminal cases and so deserve the 
opportunity to have those interests represented.12 But the movement 
merely restates the point that both legal realists and public interest 
litigators have noted: the adversary system fails to consider others 
whose interests litigation may affect. This Note disagrees with the 
conclusion of victims’ rights activists and other scholars that outside 
interests justify changing the adversary system. Congress and the 
courts can give third parties intervenor or party status, which allows 
 
 8. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 428. 
 9. Id. The court continued, 
As for actual clashes between victim and government over the best way to convict, 
punish and seek restitution from a criminal wrongdoer, how can the court presiding 
over the prosecution of the defendant referee any spat between government and 
victim about how best to make the accused pay for his, at that point, only charged 
criminal conduct? 
Id. at 429. 
 10. United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 441 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 11. For a brief history of the victims’ rights movement, see Paul G. Cassell, Treating Crime 
Victims Fairly: Integrating Victims into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 2007 UTAH L. 
REV. 861, 865–69. 
 12. See infra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
BLONDEL.DOC 10/31/2008  1:18:34 PM 
240 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:237 
 
third parties to adjudicate their rights without disrupting the 
adversary structure. 
The CVRA does not confer party or intervenor status, however; 
it instead reaffirms prosecutors’ responsibility to prosecute federal 
criminal proceedings. Yet it asks courts and prosecutors to vindicate 
the interests of victims, who remain nonparties under the statute. This 
unusual procedure places courts and prosecutors at odds with their 
constitutional and ethical obligations, and it undermines historic 
protections for criminal defendants inherent in the adversary system. 
Courts can and should interpret the CVRA narrowly to avoid these 
conflicts. 
Part I of this Note outlines the cultural values that underlie 
adversary adjudication. It demonstrates that the adversary system—
which privileges judicial independence and party autonomy—frames 
the federal criminal justice system, and it concludes that the system 
excludes third parties, including victims, by design. Part II challenges 
the victims’ rights movement’s assumption that the justice system 
should incorporate victims even at the expense of the adversary 
system. It shows that the movement has overlooked serious scholarly 
objections to considering third-party interests rather than focusing on 
the rights of the parties. And when it has crafted procedures to allow 
third parties to represent their interests, American law has 
consistently preferred to confer party status on third parties rather 
than abandon the adversary structure. Part III demonstrates that the 
CVRA fails to confer party status on victims. In an unprecedented 
disruption of the adversary structure, the CVRA instead compels 
courts and prosecutors to act as victims’ advocates, a posture that 
undermines judicial independence, prosecutorial discretion, and 
defendants’ rights. But courts can interpret the CVRA’s substantive 
rights narrowly; by limiting the scope of victims’ rights, courts can 
limit the burden on courts and prosecutors to advocate for victims 
and avoid many of these improprieties. This Note concludes that 
courts should interpret the CVRA as requiring institutional courtesy 
toward crime victims. But until Congress makes victims independent 
parties in criminal prosecutions, courts and prosecutors should not 
change their decisions based on the desires of victims. 
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I.  THE AMERICAN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 
A.  Adversary and Inquisitorial Cultures 
Western cultures resolve legal disputes through one of two basic 
approaches: the adversary model or the inquisitorial model.13 The 
models fundamentally differ in who controls the proceedings. In the 
inquisitorial model, the court actively directs the case.14 Judges in 
inquisitorial systems initiate proceedings, collect evidence, and 
determine how to construct and resolve the legal and factual issues in 
the case.15 In contrast, parties in adversary systems manage their own 
cases. They initiate proceedings, develop the evidence, and choose 
the best way to argue their position before the court.16 Judges in 
adversary systems act primarily as neutral “umpire[s].”17 Rather than 
undertaking independent investigations, they look at the evidence the 
parties bring before the court and rule on the law based on the facts 
and arguments before them.18 
These procedural differences reflect cultural assumptions about 
the purpose of legal systems.19 In the inquisitorial model, social 
interests take primacy. These societies tend to view the legal system 
primarily as a tool to investigate and uncover the truth.20 Unlike 
adversary systems, which prize rules of evidence and procedure, 
inquisitorial systems generally disfavor rules that might obstruct 
uncovering the truth.21 For example, inquisitorial courts admit 
 
 13. See Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and 
the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1183 (2005) 
(comparing the United States’ adversary system with the “dark inquisitorial world of 
continental Europe”). Although no system is completely inquisitorial or adversarial, legal 
systems usually emerge from one method or the other. Id. at 1187. 
 14. Id. at 1188. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer Richard Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary 
System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CAL. L. REV. 313, 320–21 
& n.23 (1991). 
 19. See Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 277, 280 (2002) (arguing that the United States’ “cultural predilections are reflected in 
four important aspects of civil procedure that are peculiarly American”). 
 20. Felicity Nagorcka, Michael Stanton & Michael Wilson, Stranded Between Partisanship 
and the Truth? A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Ethics in the Adversarial and Inquisitorial 
Systems of Justice, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 448, 462–63 (2005). 
 21. Id. 
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evidence even if authorities improperly collected it.22 Inquisitorial 
systems focus more on achieving the right result than on strictly 
enforcing procedures.23 
In contrast, adversary systems value parties’ rights to have their 
disputes resolved through a fair process monitored by a judge.24 
Although adversary systems assume that the parties’ self-interests 
drive them to uncover the truth for the jury,25 these cultures 
ultimately show less desire to achieve the correct result. For example, 
these legal systems tend to develop firm procedural default rules that 
outsiders may view as unfairly harsh.26 But protecting the process—
and thereby protecting party autonomy—justifies sacrificing some 
accuracy in the outcome of the litigation. 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Won Kidane, Revisiting the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Applicable in 
Adversarial Administrative Deportation Proceedings: Lessons from the Department of Labor 
Rules of Evidence, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 124 n.170 (2007) (noting that under French law the 
“honor and conscience,” C. PR. PÉN. art. 310(1), of judges binds them to discover the truth and 
that German law allows a court to, “upon its own motion, extend the taking of the evidence to 
all facts and evidence which are important for the [court’s] decision,” StPO  
§ 244(2)). 
 24. Nagorcka et al., supra note 20, at 462–63. 
 25. Id. at 462. 
 26. Id. at 462–63. The Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. 
Ct. 2669 (2006), illustrates the tension between adversarial and inquisitorial philosophies. One 
of the defendants in that case, Mario Bustillo, was a Honduran national who was prosecuted in 
Virginia state court without being afforded his right under the Vienna Convention to consult 
with the Honduran Consulate. Id. at 2676. Bustillo first raised this issue in a habeas corpus 
petition, however, and lower courts ruled that because he raised the issue on collateral rather 
than direct review, Bustillo was procedurally barred from litigating the claim. Id. at 2676–77, 
2682. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) disagreed, holding that the Vienna Convention 
required American courts to permit defendants to raise this issue even on collateral appeal. Id. 
at 2683. 
 The Supreme Court rejected the ICJ’s interpretation. Writing for the majority, Chief 
Justice John Roberts discussed at some length the difference between inquisitorial and 
adversary litigation. Id. at 2685–86. He reasoned that the ICJ overlooked the importance of 
procedural default rules in adversary systems. Id. at 2686. The ICJ’s interpretation of the 
Vienna Convention would allow Convention claims to “trump not only procedural default rules, 
but any number of other rules requiring parties to present their legal claims at the appropriate 
time for adjudication.” Id. These rules are so critical to preserving the fairness of adversary 
litigation that adversary courts enforce them even at the expense of viable legal claims. See id. at 
2687 (“[I]t is well established that where a defendant fails to raise a Miranda claim at trial, 
procedural default rules may bar him from raising the claim in a subsequent postconviction 
proceeding.”). The Court concluded that Bustillo’s claim was procedurally barred. Id.  
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B. The Federal Justice System 
American legal culture generally follows the adversary 
tradition.27 As one scholar has explained, “[t]he framers, reacting 
against the King’s autocratic judiciary, wanted both to ensure federal 
judicial independence from the Executive and to vest substantial 
adjudicatory power in the people.”28 As a result, adversary philosophy 
has shaped the constitutional, procedural, and ethical structure of the 
federal criminal justice system. 
1. Federal Courts.  Article III of the U.S. Constitution vests 
judicial power in the federal courts to resolve the “Cases” and 
“Controversies” before them.29 The cases-and-controversies principle 
lays the foundation for the limited, adversary nature of the federal 
justice system. As Chief Justice Marshall declared in Marbury v. 
Madison, the courts resolve the rights of individuals and should not 
intrude on the executive’s responsibility to enforce the law.30 This 
limitation allows courts to make decisions based on “concrete legal 
issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions,”31 and it grants 
parties autonomy to vindicate their rights.32 
The cases-and-controversies principle also preserves the 
separation of power between the branches of government.33 The 
 
 27. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 382 (1982). The American 
legal system is not purely adversarial. Courts of equity, for example, are rooted in inquisitorial 
procedure. Kessler, supra note 13, at 1193. But the American legal system “is considered more 
adversarial than most.” Resnik, supra, at 382. And criminal cases traditionally have proceeded 
in adversary common law courts, not courts of equity. Charles L. Barzun, Politics or Principle? 
Zechariah Chafee and the Social Interest in Free Speech, 2007 BYU L. REV. 259, 287–88; see also 
Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1361, 1368 (2005) (distinguishing the “inquisitorial model of the courts of equity” from “the 
adversarial mode of the common law courts”). 
 28. Resnik, supra note 27, at 381 (footnote omitted). 
 29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 30. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 31. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947) (quoting United States v. 
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 423 (1940)). As Justice Scalia noted, rejecting a 
doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction, “[h]ypothetical jurisdiction produces nothing more than a 
hypothetical judgment.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998). 
 32. See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“Our adversary system is designed around the premise that the 
parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments 
entitling them to relief.”). 
 33. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677–78 (1988). For example, the Court has long held 
that it cannot resolve political questions because those questions implicate the policy judgments 
BLONDEL.DOC 10/31/2008  1:18:34 PM 
244 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:237 
 
Supreme Court has prohibited judges from acting as policymakers 
rather than independent interpreters of the law: “executive or 
administrative duties of a nonjudicial nature may not be imposed on 
judges holding office under Art. III of the Constitution.”34 Not only 
does a limited judiciary protect the policymaking branches,35 but it 
also frees the judiciary to focus its attention on allowing the parties to 
vindicate their rights before an impartial tribunal. 
Ideally, the federal judiciary exhibits two key traits of adversary 
judges: it ensures that the proceedings give both parties a fair 
opportunity to present their cases, and it remains impartial toward 
parties.36 First, judges bear responsibility for preserving a fair forum 
for litigation. The Constitution, for example, vests significant 
responsibility for protecting defendants’ constitutional rights in the 
judiciary.37 Procedurally, judges manage the proceedings and regulate 
the relationship between the parties.38 Second, federal judges refrain 
from acting as advocates.39 Fundamental to the American ideal of a 
fair forum for adjudication is the concept of the “judge as an impartial 
guardian for the rule of law.”40 The federal judiciary thus exhibits the 
adversary model’s emphasis on allowing individual parties the 
 
of the other branches and are beyond courts’ Article III jurisdiction. E.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 
444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I am of the view that the 
basic question presented by the petitioners in this case is ‘political’ and therefore nonjusticiable 
because it involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our country’s foreign 
relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action 
of the President.”). 
 34. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976)). 
 35. Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 230 (1990). 
 36. See supra notes 17–18, 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 37. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 
1014–15 (2006). 
 38. For example, judges regulate discovery, FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d), and rule on the parties’ 
pretrial motions, FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)–(d). 
 39. Resnik, supra note 27, at 382. 
 40. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 129 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Federal law requires 
judges to recuse themselves from a case “in which [their] impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006). Federal judges sometimes do actively protect the rights 
of particularly vulnerable parties, such as pro se litigants. E.g., Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 
639 (2d Cir. 2007). The purpose of these interventions is not for courts to assume advocacy 
duties; the parties remain responsible for litigating their cases. See id. (asking courts to “liberally 
construe [a pro se litigant’s] pleadings” but not asking the court to litigate on the pro se 
plaintiff’s behalf). Courts show more leniency toward technical procedural issues to prevent 
unfairly excluding nonlawyers. E.g., id. Courts act, then, to preserve the fairness of the 
proceedings—a quintessentially adversary duty. 
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freedom to vindicate their interests in a fair forum. As a result, 
though, the federal courts exclude outsiders to the litigation, 
including victims.41 
2. The Parties.  With a limited judiciary, primary responsibility 
for vindicating legal rights rests with the parties to litigation.42 With 
few exceptions,43 federal courts still assume that “the parties know 
what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and 
arguments entitling them to relief.”44 
 a. The Prosecution.  The responsibility to enforce the United 
States’ laws rests with the executive branch. The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly protected the executive’s constitutional duties to 
prosecute criminal offenses. The Court has held that because 
prosecution is a core executive function, statutes may not 
“impermissibly interfere” with the executive’s prosecutorial powers.45 
Under the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion, prosecutors have 
near-absolute power to determine whether to bring criminal charges,46 
whether to pursue a prosecution, and how to negotiate a plea 
bargain.47 Contrary to the suggestion of some victims’ rights 
 
 41. In France’s inquisitorial system, by contrast, the investigating judge may consider 
outside interests such as victims, animals, minority groups, or the environment and even permit 
those parties or their representatives to participate in the proceedings. Nagorcka et al., supra 
note 20, at 460–61. 
 42. See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (“Our adversary system is designed around the premise that the 
parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments 
entitling them to relief.”). 
 43. See infra Part II.C. 
 44. Castro, 540 U.S. at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 45. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660, 659–60, 695 (1988). In Morrison, the Court found 
that the statute was valid because it did not impermissibly interfere with the executive’s 
prosecutorial power. Id. 
 46. See id. at 710–11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that the executive is responsible for 
prosecuting criminal offenses, that the other branches have means to check that balance, and 
that Congress can “impeach the executive who willfully fails to enforce the laws . . . and the 
courts can dismiss malicious prosecutions” (citation omitted)); Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility 
v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 1973) (“[F]ederal courts have traditionally and, to our 
knowledge, uniformly refrained from overturning, at the instance of a private person, 
discretionary decisions of federal prosecuting authorities not to prosecute persons regarding 
whom a complaint of criminal conduct is made.”). 
 47. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 
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advocates, including the CVRA’s drafters,48 federal prosecutors, not 
victims, have carried sole responsibility to prosecute federal offenses 
since the Judiciary Act of 1789.49 Federal law continues to vest all 
prosecutorial responsibilities in United States attorneys.50 
Federal prosecutors represent the interests of the United States, 
not the interests of victims or other specific third parties. As the 
Supreme Court has observed, by representing the United States, 
federal prosecutors have a responsibility to vindicate the public’s 
interest in justice.51 This obligation to seek justice, though, is 
“twofold”: prosecutors must ensure “that guilt shall not escape or 
innocence suffer.”52 As a result, prosecutors have a duty both to the 
public and to the defendant to make sure justice is done. Prosecutors’ 
codes of ethics generally agree that prosecutors are “ministers of 
justice.”53 Additionally, prosecutors have a duty to remain impartial 
toward private interests.54 Thus, federal prosecutors should consider 
 
 48. Senator Dianne Feinstein, for example, has repeatedly relied on an inaccurate history 
of public prosecution in American law to justify expanding victims’ rights. Promoting a victims’ 
rights amendment to the Constitution, she argued that “a constitutional amendment will restore 
rights that existed when the Constitution was written. It is a little known fact that at the time the 
Constitution was drafted, it was standard practice for victims, not public prosecutors, to 
prosecute criminal cases.” Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Crime Victims: 
Hearing on S.J. Res. 1 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 4 (2003) (statement of 
Sen. Dianne Feinstein). Later, when sponsoring a federal statute recognizing victims’ rights, 
Senator Feinstein argued that “[v]ictims had rights until about the mid-19th century, the 1850s, 
when the concept of the public prosecutor was developed in our Nation.” 150 CONG. REC. 
S4261 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). In fact, “the American system of 
public prosecution was fairly well established by the time of the American Revolution.” Juan 
Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 357, 371 
(1986). And victims never have prosecuted federal criminal cases. See infra note 49 and 
accompanying text. 
 49. Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. 
L. REV. 689, 700–01 (2004). 
 50. 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) (2006). 
 51. The Court has explained, 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a 
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 52. Id. 
 53. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (1999) (“A prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”). 
 54. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U.S. 787, 804 (1987). In Young, 
Louis Vuitton, S.A. (Louis Vuitton) settled a lawsuit against the defendants for trademark 
infringement. Id. at 790. Louis Vuitton’s civil attorneys convinced the trial court to appoint 
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the interests of third parties, including victims, but only in the broader 
context of society’s interest in justice. They should not elevate 
victims’ interests over the interests of the public, the community, and 
the defendant. 
 b. Defendants.  In criminal prosecutions, the defendant is the 
prosecution’s adversary. The Constitution reflects this position: as 
one scholar notes, “[o]ne of the animating features of the 
Constitution is its preoccupation with the regulation of the 
government’s criminal powers.”55 The number of amendments in the 
Bill of Rights devoted to protecting defendants from government 
authority demonstrates the Framers’ concern for ensuring that the 
adversary process is fair.56 Defendants have a right to due process of 
law;57 notice of charges against them; assistance of counsel; 
confrontation of witnesses against them; and a fair, speedy, and public 
trial by a jury drawn from the community.58 
This framework protects defendants from government conduct, 
not the acts of private third parties outside the litigation.59 Given the 
number of protections it affords to criminal defendants, the Bill of 
Rights appears to assume that the government is the defendant’s 
adversary in criminal proceedings. It does not anticipate third parties 
such as crime victims presenting a challenge to the liberty of accused 
defendants. Victims’ advocates therefore rightly observe that the 
 
them to represent the United States in a later prosecution of the defendants for continuing to 
infringe Louis Vuitton’s trademark. Id. at 791–92. The Supreme Court held that it was improper 
to appoint the beneficiary of the court order to prosecute a contempt action claiming a violation 
of the settlement agreement. Id. at 809 (Brennan, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). 
The Court observed that “[r]egardless of whether the appointment of private counsel in this 
case resulted in any prosecutorial impropriety . . . that appointment illustrates the potential for 
private interest to influence the discharge of public duty.” Id. at 805 (majority opinion). This 
influence was improper because “[t]he prosecutor is appointed solely to pursue the public 
interest in vindication of the court’s authority. A private attorney appointed to prosecute a 
criminal contempt therefore certainly should be as disinterested as a public prosecutor who 
undertakes such a prosecution.” Id. at 804. 
 55. Barkow, supra note 37, at 1012. 
 56. See id. at 1016–17 (arguing that the Bill of Rights contains structural protections for 
defendants in the adversary process). 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 58. Id. amend. VI. 
 59. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Colloquy Essay, A Pragmatic Defense 
of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 393 n.44 (2007) (“With the exception of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the Constitution does not regulate private conduct at all.”). 
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traditional justice system prevents victims from representing their 
interests in criminal cases,60 but this exclusion is by design. 
II.  MULTIPLE INTERESTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Victims’ rights proponents have joined a number of scholars 
arguing that fairness requires modifying the adversary system to 
consider interests beside those of the parties. Section B demonstrates 
that these critics overlook another problem: if litigation considers 
third-party interests, it loses focus on the rights of the actual parties. 
Section C argues that American law has resolved this conflict by 
conferring party-like status on third parties, allowing them to 
vindicate their interests without undermining the adversary structure. 
A. Criminal Justice in Adversary Proceedings 
Because it proceeds according to adversary principles, the 
federal criminal justice system, like all American criminal 
proceedings, prizes fair process and party autonomy even at the 
expense of a correct result.61 But in criminal prosecutions the stakes 
are particularly high. If the outcome is incorrect, either an innocent 
person loses that person’s freedom, even life, or a guilty person 
escapes punishment, endangering society and leaving the victim’s 
suffering unanswered.62 Criminal law is uniquely emotional as a result; 
ensuring procedural fairness may seem like a minor concern when 
discussing something as explosive as child rape or executing an 
innocent person.63 
Some scholars and advocates have promoted distorting adversary 
procedures to improve criminal prosecutions. The victims’ rights 
 
 60. E.g., Cardenas, supra note 48, at 372. 
 61. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 62. Interest groups devoted to reforming the system to achieve more accurate results 
demonstrate the significance of this issue. For example, the Innocence Project exists both to 
“free the staggering numbers of innocent people who remain incarcerated and to bring 
substantive reform to the system responsible for their unjust imprisonment.” Innocence Project, 
Mission Statement, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/Mission-Statement.php (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2008). Similarly, victims’ rights groups such as the National Organization for Victim 
Assistance have argued that victims have the right to protection and “reparations.” Nat’l Org. 
for Victim Assistance, Crime Victim & Witness Rights, http://www.trynova.org/about/ 
victimrights.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2008). 
 63. The tension between process and the high-stakes nature of criminal proceedings 
probably in part explains the heated disagreement between the International Court of Justice 
and the Supreme Court in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon. See supra note 26. 
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movement contends that criminal cases should consider victims’ 
interests in addition to the government’s interests. These advocates 
argue that excluding victims from the justice system, especially in light 
of their suffering, is fundamentally unjust.64 At least one victims’ 
rights scholar has called for changing the adversary system to fully 
vindicate victims’ interests.65 Other scholars, concerned that too many 
defendants are wrongfully convicted, advocate greater inquisitorial 
proceedings to protect innocent defendants.66 
Victims’ rights proponents, at least, have enjoyed enormous 
success persuading Congress and state legislatures to incorporate 
victims into criminal prosecutions.67 But pro-victim scholars and 
legislators have assumed uncritically that the law should remedy the 
injustice of excluding victims by incorporating them into proceedings. 
In their concern for victims’ suffering, however, victims’ rights 
advocates have not addressed the theoretical and practical 
implications of their solution. In fact, commentators have long 
recognized a core conflict between the adversary model and third-
party interests.68 Section B shows that scholars already have raised 
important objections to undermining the adversary system to help 
third parties. And Section C demonstrates that American law has 
 
 64. See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S10,910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) 
(arguing, in support of the CVRA, that “[v]ictims are the persons who are directly harmed by 
the crime and they have a stake in the criminal process because of that harm”); William T. Pizzi, 
Victims’ Rights: Rethinking Our “Adversary System,” 1999 UTAH L. REV. 349, 349 (noting that 
“victims of violent crime have a stake in the trial that is different from that of the general public 
or even the prosecutor” and calling for greater victim participation in criminal proceedings); 
Judith Rowland, Illusions of Justice: Who Represents the Victim?, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 177, 178 (1992) (observing that “a crime victim has an ‘interest’ in the criminal 
justice process” and lamenting that only the state and the defendant have standing to participate 
in criminal prosecutions). 
 65. Pizzi, supra note 64, at 349. 
 66. Tim Bakken, Truth and Innocence Procedures to Free Innocent Persons: Beyond the 
Adversarial System, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 547, 550, 551 (2008) (urging “a fundamental 
restructuring of the adversarial system” to “minimize the number of convictions of innocent 
persons” and contending that after this change “the justice system would be more focused on 
achieving a correct result in cases where a criminal defendant knows he is truly innocent and 
formally pleads innocent”). 
 67. In addition to the CVRA, every state has passed victims’ rights legislation, and a 
majority of states have amended their constitutions to recognize victims’ rights as well. Recent 
Development, The Victims’ Rights Amendment, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 525, 526–27 (2005). 
 68. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 67–71 (5th ed. 2003) 
(describing the tension between the “private rights” and “public rights” model). 
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found a different solution, one which incorporates third parties 
without discarding the adversary system. 
B. The Problem of Considering Nonparty Interests in Adversary 
Litigation 
Classical legal scholars had no reason to question excluding 
victims from criminal proceedings. Adversary criminal proceedings 
between the government and the prosecution solidified in the 
nineteenth century,69 an era that assumed that litigation could be 
divided into public and private law.70 As early as the eighteenth 
century, William Blackstone declared that “[w]rongs are divisible into 
two sorts or species; private wrongs, and public wrongs.”71 For 
Blackstone, the quality of the wrong dictates the appropriate remedy. 
Because private law protects personal rights, private citizens are 
responsible for bringing civil suits to vindicate their interests.72 In 
contrast, criminal offenses injure public rights, and so the king, as the 
sovereign, bears responsibility for prosecuting public offenses.73 This 
legal philosophy tended to view the law as rigid and rule based rather 
than as an instrument of public policy.74 The public-private distinction 
therefore justified public prosecutions; because criminal law’s public 
nature necessitated a public remedy, the government, not victims, 
logically prosecuted criminal cases. 
Beginning in the early twentieth century, legal realism 
challenged this assumption.75 Legal realist theory rejects the public-
 
 69. See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in Historical 
Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1325–26 (2002) (“[P]rivate citizens continued to initiate 
and litigate criminal prosecutions in New York until the 1840s or 1850s . . . .”). 
 70. See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1423, 1424 (1982) (“The emergence of the market as a central legitimating institution 
brought the public/private distinction into the core of legal discourse during the nineteenth 
century.”). 
 71. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
 72. Id. at *2–3. 
 73. 4 id. at *2. 
 74. See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 31, 44 (1995) (explaining that nineteenth-century legal scholars viewed the law as 
founded on sharp dichotomies such as public-private that dictate the “essential character” of 
legal fields). 
 75. See Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1915, 1917 (2005) (“The legal realist movement flourished back in the 1920s and 30s . . . .”); 
Horwitz, supra note 70, at 1426 (tracing the legal realists’ assault on the public-private 
dichotomy to the 1905 Supreme Court opinion Lochner v. New York). 
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private distinction; it teaches that private law affects public interests, 
and public rules affect private life.76 For example, public legislation 
regulating railroads, labor, and agriculture shapes the private 
contractual relationships of parties.77 Public interests, such as the 
public’s interest in avoiding nuisances, limit property owners’ rights.78 
And even though the family represents one of the most private areas 
of an individual’s life, the family also plays a central role in shaping 
civil society by raising future generations.79 As a result, the state, often 
acting through a welfare agency, routinely intervenes in family life to 
make sure that families are performing this role to society’s 
standards.80 By showing the fallacy of the public-private distinction, 
legal realism undermines a key justification for public rather than 
private prosecutions.81 Legal realism agrees with victims’ rights 
advocates: criminal prosecutions affect private as well as public 
interests. 
This brand of legal realism is essentially descriptive. But since 
the 1960s and 1970s, many legal scholars have used aspects of legal 
realism prescriptively. Public interest scholarship argues that because 
litigation affects public interests, lawyers should use it to drive public 
policy.82 Rejecting court neutrality, this theory requires courts to act 
as regulatory agents, supervising complex and ongoing social policy 
efforts such as reforming prisons and mental hospitals, desegregating 
 
 76. James Boyle, Legal Realism and the Social Contract: Fuller’s Public Jurisprudence of 
Form, Private Jurisprudence of Substance, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 371, 378–79 (1993). 
 77. Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 202–03 (1937). 
 78. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 21–26 (1927). 
 79. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1349, 1356 (1982) (“It has been common forever to speak of the public functions of 
the family in producing and socializing ‘the next generation.’”). 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. at 1357 (arguing that one cannot “take the public/private distinction seriously as 
a description, as an explanation, or as a justification of anything”). 
 82. E.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281 passim (1976). Professor Chayes argues that 
just as the traditional concept reflected and related to a system in which social and 
economic arrangements were remitted to autonomous private action, so the new 
model reflects and relates to a regulatory system where these arrangements are the 
product of positive enactment. In such a system, enforcement and application of law 
is necessarily implementation of regulatory policy. Litigation inevitably becomes an 
explicitly political forum and the court a visible arm of the political process. 
Id. at 1304. 
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schools, and improving public housing.83 The idea that litigation can 
effect social change for group interests remains popular in American 
legal culture; for example, the gay community has combated social 
discrimination by litigating against the military’s “don’t-ask-don’t-
tell” policy and for judicial recognition of gay marriage.84 Victims’ 
rights advocacy, which also emerged in the 1960s and 1970s,85 mirrors 
public interest scholarship. Rather than using private litigation to 
achieve public goals, it argues that public prosecutions should 
consider private interests. 
But public interest litigation has proven difficult to square with 
the structural and especially the ethical culture of the adversary 
system.86 Professor Derrick A. Bell, in his classic treatment of the 
issue, demonstrates that lawyers litigating school desegregation cases 
after Brown v. Board of Education87 often failed their ethical 
obligations to their clients.88 Adversary attorneys owe their loyalty to 
best vindicating their clients’ rights and interests89—but when litigating 
post-Brown desegregation cases, attorneys generally considered long-
term social policy goals rather than the client’s immediate needs.90 For 
example, the NAACP’s attorneys and donors saw litigation as a 
vehicle to obtain widespread racial desegregation.91 But by the 1970s, 
some clients began to want more immediate concerns addressed 
instead, such as improving educational quality or minimizing busing 
to violent white neighborhoods.92 When the lawyers acted to promote 
desegregation even at the expense of their clients’ interests, Bell 
 
 83. Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public 
Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1266–67. 
 84. William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group 
Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 YALE L.J. 1623, 1635–42 (1997). 
 85. Indeed, some commentators have linked the victims’ rights movement to larger social 
rights’ movements of the era. E.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Trouble with Trials; the Trouble 
with Us, 105 YALE L.J. 825, 825 (1995) (book review). 
 86. See Rubenstein, supra note 84, at 1626 (observing that group litigation creates conflicts 
within the group and arguing that “our current procedural and ethical rules too heavily favor 
individualism alone”). 
 87. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 88. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in 
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 472 (1976). 
 89. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., ¶ 2 (1999). 
 90. Bell, supra note 88, at 482–93. 
 91. Id. at 488–93. 
 92. Id. at 482. 
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argues, they violated their fundamental responsibility to act as 
adversary advocates.93 
Professor Bell’s article demonstrates that public interest 
litigation forgets legal realism’s other lesson: just as private litigation 
affects public interests, public litigation affects private interests. The 
NAACP lawyers Bell critiques had noble intentions, but their 
ultimate aim—to promote desegregation as educational and social 
policy—did not always match the interests of their actual clients. 
Because these lawyers chose to act through the adversary process 
rather than by lobbying legislators or the executive branch, they 
placed themselves in an impossible ethical situation. Victims’ rights 
scholars have failed to acknowledge that asking the justice system to 
vindicate private rather than public interests could create similar 
ethical problems. As Chief Justice Marshall observed,94 adversary 
litigation is designed to vindicate the rights of the parties. It becomes 
difficult to do so when lawyers and the courts are representing other 
interests instead. 
C. Representing Multiple Interests in Adversary Proceedings 
The adversary system thus creates conflict between the rights of 
litigants and the interests of third parties. Victims’ rights proponents 
and other scholars have proposed ignoring inconvenient aspects of 
the adversary process. Although this approach is tempting, 
particularly in light of the consequences of criminal prosecutions, 
Professor Bell’s observations demonstrate that it overlooks important 
counterarguments. This Section demonstrates that American law has 
resolved the conflict between litigants and third parties differently 
than these scholars have proposed. Rather than undermining 
adversary litigation, American law has created a variety of procedural 
devices that confer party or quasi-party status on interested third 
parties or allow them to present their position to the court without 
litigating the case’s merits. These solutions allow third parties to 
litigate their interests without disrupting two key features of the 
adversary system: party autonomy and court neutrality. 
 
 93. See id. at 472 (“[I]t is difficult to provide standards for the attorney and protection for 
the client where the source of the conflict is the attorney’s ideals. . . . ‘No servant can serve two 
masters . . . .’” (quoting Luke 16:13 (King James))). 
 94. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
BLONDEL.DOC 10/31/2008  1:18:34 PM 
254 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:237 
 
The amicus curiae device allows outsiders to present legal 
arguments to appellate courts without having party status. A third 
party with an interest in an appellate case may ask the court or the 
parties for permission to file a brief presenting relevant and useful 
additional arguments to the court.95 The broadness of the standards 
for filing an amicus brief is balanced by the narrowness of an amicus 
curiae’s formal power. An amicus curiae only has the right, after 
permission, to file a brief;96 it cannot litigate the merits of a legal 
claim.97 The court retains total discretion whether and how to 
consider the amicus brief,98 and the parties remain responsible for 
shaping the issues and arguments for appeal.99 This device allows third 
parties to share their perspective with the court without requiring the 
court or the parties to change their behavior or decisions. 
Third parties may obtain permission to litigate the merits of a 
claim related to a civil case by intervening in the proceedings. The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize two kinds of intervention. 
Parties with a “cognizable legal interest” in the subject of the case 
have a right to intervene100 unless one of the parties already 
“adequately” represents that interest.101 Permissive intervention 
allows third parties to adjudicate additional claims they have that 
share “common questions of law and fact” with the main case.102 
 
 95. See SUP. CT. R. 37 (requiring permission either from the Court or the parties to file an 
amicus curiae brief and stating that “[a]n amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the 
Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable 
help to the Court”); FED. R. APP. P. 29(a)–(b) (requiring an amicus curiae to obtain permission 
either from the court or the parties and to file a motion with the proposed brief stating “the 
movant’s interest” and “the reason why an amicus brief is desirable and why the matters 
asserted are relevant to the disposition of the case”). 
 96. 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3975.1 (3d ed. 1999). 
 97. United States v. Michigan, 940 F.2d 143, 165–66 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 98. See id. at 165 (“[P]articipation as an amicus . . . continues to be[] a privilege within the 
sound discretion of the courts . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 99. See Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120, 127 n.5 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A]n amicus 
curiae generally cannot expand the scope of an appeal to implicate issues that have not been 
presented by the parties to the appeal.” (quoting Resident Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Urban Dev., 980 F.2d 1043, 1049 (5th Cir. 1993))). 
 100. Brody ex rel. Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1116 (3d Cir. 1992); see also FED. R. 
CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (granting third parties a right to intervene if the litigation ultimately would 
injure the third party’s interest in the “property or transaction that is the subject of the action”). 
 101. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
 102. Id. 24(b)(1)(B); United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians of Okla. v. United 
States, 78 Fed. Cl. 303, 304, 306 (2007). 
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Intervenors are treated like the original parties and may litigate the 
merits of their claims.103 The intervenor device therefore preserves the 
adversary structure by treating intervenors as parties, which avoids 
distorting the role of the original parties or the judge. 
Some statutes simply confer party status on outsiders to 
litigation. Qui tam statutes, for example, allow private citizens to 
bring civil claims in the government’s name.104 The most commonly 
litigated qui tam statute is the federal False Claims Act,105 under 
which citizens may bring civil fraud claims in the name of the United 
States.106 Once a citizen, called a “relator,”107 brings a qui tam suit, the 
government may intervene.108 If the government does not intervene, 
the relator prosecutes the case on the government’s behalf.109 Even if 
the government does intervene, the relator remains a party to the 
action.110 But the government and the relator litigate their cases 
separately and then share in the recovery,111 much like coplaintiffs in 
any civil proceeding. 
Other procedures permit a litigant to stand in the shoes of a third 
party that, for some reason, cannot vindicate its own interests. The 
derivative suit allows shareholders to bring claims on behalf of a 
corporation when the corporation’s officers and directors will not.112 
Because only the corporation is a party, not the shareholder as an 
individual, the basic adversary structure remains. A series of Supreme 
Court decisions also have relaxed the standing requirement and 
permitted a litigant to vindicate the rights and interests of a third 
party that cannot join an action if the litigant shares a relationship 
with the third party.113 For example, defendants may raise equal 
protection claims on behalf of jurors excluded from the defendant’s 
 
 103. Schneider v. Dumbarton Developers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1007, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 104. Christina Orsini Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An 
Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 949 (2007). 
 105. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 (2000). 
 106. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2000); Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 769. 
 107.  Broderick, supra note 104, at 952. 
 108. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). 
 109. Id. § 3730(b)(4)(B). 
 110. Id. § 3730(c)(1). 
 111. Id. §§ 3730(c), (d)(1). 
 112. DEBORAH A. DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 
§ 1:1 (2003). 
 113. FALLON ET AL., supra note 68, at 175–76. 
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trial through race-based peremptory challenges.114 This procedure 
preserves the litigant’s autonomy because the litigant chooses 
whether and how to vindicate the third party’s interests. Neither the 
court nor the party has a duty to litigate on the third party’s behalf. 
Congress and the courts have developed a variety of methods to 
permit third parties to represent their interests in Article III 
litigation. Procedural rules and statutes may allow the third party to 
act as an amicus curiae, intervene in the case, or simply obtain party 
status. They also may allow litigants to bring a claim on behalf of a 
third party. None of these devices imposes a duty on a litigant to 
represent a third party’s interests even if those interests are at odds 
with the litigant’s own. And none requires courts to vindicate the 
rights of outsiders to the litigation without first conferring party 
status. These devices therefore preserve party autonomy and judicial 
independence—two critical traits of the federal justice system that the 
CVRA ignores. 
III. THE CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS ACT IN THE FEDERAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
The CVRA provides little guidance to courts and prosecutors 
incorporating the statute into federal prosecutions; as a result, the 
statute’s impact on the federal justice system is uncertain. This Part 
examines the statute’s text, particularly its enforcement provisions, 
and concludes that the CVRA really asks for institutional courtesy 
toward victims, not sweeping changes to federal prosecutions. Section 
A shows that the statute’s vague rights and conflicted legislative 
history leave room for interpretation. Section B argues that the 
statute’s enforcement provisions fail to confer party or intervenor 
status on victims, indicating that the CVRA gives victims little real 
power. Instead, the CVRA requires courts and prosecutors to 
vindicate victims’ interests. This procedural posture forces courts to 
act as advocates—even against the accused—and forces prosecutors 
to promote interests that may conflict with the government’s own. 
But Section C demonstrates that many of the CVRA’s provisions 
permit a much narrower interpretation. Because Congress has not 
rejected the public prosecution model, and because a broad 
interpretation of the CVRA could present real conflicts for courts 
 
 114. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991). 
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and prosecutors, courts should narrowly interpret the statute to 
require institutional courtesy rather than sweeping new rights. 
A. The Crime Victims’ Rights Act: Statutory History and Text 
Congress passed the CVRA as a compromise between victims’ 
rights advocates, who had fought for nearly a decade to pass a 
constitutional victims’ rights amendment, and congressional 
opponents of the proposed amendment.115 Because Congress rushed 
to pass the statute, the legislative history supporting the CVRA is 
sparse, consisting only of two floor statements by the statute’s 
sponsors, Senators Dianne Feinstein and Jon Kyl.116 These floor 
statements support multiple interpretations of the CVRA’s purpose, 
reflecting the statute’s history as a compromise. On one hand, its 
drafters took pains to stress that the rights in the CVRA “do not 
come at the expense of defendant’s [sic] rights.”117 But they also 
demanded that courts and prosecutors avoid “whittl[ing] down or 
marginaliz[ing]” victims’ rights and “treat victims of crime with the 
respect they deserve and . . . afford them due process.”118 Overall the 
floor statements appear designed to appease both victims’ proponents 
and skeptics of victims’ rights; as a result, the statute’s legislative 
history and purpose leave considerable room for interpretation.119 
The CVRA’s ambiguous statutory text exacerbates the confusion 
that this conflicted legislative history may create. The CVRA 
developed from a proposed constitutional amendment.120 When it 
became clear that Congress would not approve the amendment, 
 
 115. See 150 CONG. REC. S4261 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) 
(discussing the victims’ rights amendment’s authors’ struggles to garner support for a federal 
constitutional amendment); Jon Kyl, Steven J. Twist & Stephen Higgins, On the Wings of Their 
Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn 
Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 581, 588–91 (2005) (reciting the history of 
the failed proposed victims’ rights amendment). 
 116. Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (mem.). 
 117. 150 CONG. REC. S4262 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
 118. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 119. Compare United States v. Holland, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2005) (mem.) 
(calling the CVRA “the new, mushy, ‘feel good statute’”), with United States v. Heaton, 458 F. 
Supp. 2d 1271, 1272 (D. Utah 2006) (mem.) (“Congress plainly intended to give victims broad 
rights to fair treatment.”). 
 120. See Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 323 n.3 (describing the CVRA’s origins in a proposed 
victims’ rights amendment). 
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victims’ rights proponents passed the measure as a statute instead.121 
As a result, the CVRA reads more like an amendment than a statute, 
with sweeping statements of rights and no discussion of how those 
rights should be implemented. It grants victims eight substantive and 
procedural rights: the right to be reasonably protected from the 
accused, the right to be notified of public proceedings, the right not to 
be excluded from public proceedings, the right to be heard at 
designated proceedings, the right to proceedings free from 
unreasonable delay, the right to confer with the prosecution, the right 
to restitution as permitted by law, and the right to be treated with 
fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy.122 Nowhere does the 
statute state how these rights should affect courts’ and prosecutors’ 
decisions during criminal proceedings. 
The CVRA also fails to explain another important detail: how 
courts and prosecutors should recognize victims’ rights when 
prosecutors have not yet brought criminal charges. It defines “victim” 
as a person who is “directly and proximately harmed as a result of the 
commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of 
Columbia.”123 Although the statute does not define “offense,” its 
legislative history and plain language appear to confer victim status 
even if the government has not brought charges.124 
It is odd that a statute with such broad language and expansive 
application provides no guidance to the courts and prosecutors who 
actually apply it to federal prosecutions. The explanation for this 
omission is probably political: passing the CVRA presented an 
opportunity to help crime victims, a broadly sympathetic group. In its 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (2006). 
 123. Id. § 3771(e). For a discussion of the difficulty of determining who is a “victim” within 
the meaning of the statute, see United States v. Sharp, 463 F. Supp. 2d 556, 561–67 (E.D. Va. 
2006) (mem.). 
 124. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (allowing a victim to seek a writ of mandamus for denial of 
any statutory rights “if no prosecution is underway, in the district court in the district in which 
the crime occurred”); 150 CONG. REC. S10,912 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) 
(claiming to have written “an intentionally broad definition because all victims of crime deserve 
to have their rights protected, whether or not they are the victim of the count charged”). The 
practical difficulties of this interpretation have led the Department of Justice to apply the 
CVRA only to charged conduct. See OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE 9 (2005), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/final.pdf (“[A] victim is ‘a person directly and proximately harmed 
as a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of Columbia’ . . . 
if the offense is charged in federal district court.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)). 
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haste to pass popular legislation, however, Congress did not bother 
considering the CVRA’s practical implications. As a result, Congress 
passed a statute that—probably unintentionally—conflicts with the 
basic structure of the federal criminal justice system. 
B. Enforcing the CVRA in an Adversary System 
1. The CVRA’s Enforcement Provisions.  Its drafters claimed that 
the CVRA “mak[es] victims independent participants in the criminal 
justice process”125 and gives victims the chance to enforce their 
participation rights.126 But the CVRA does not change federal 
prosecutors’ constitutional and statutory responsibilities to enforce 
federal criminal law. The statute expressly states that it does not 
infringe prosecutorial discretion.127 And nowhere does the CVRA 
suggest that it confers party or even intervenor status on victims.128 
The government and the defendant thus remain the sole parties to 
criminal prosecutions. 
Because victims have no formal status under the CVRA, courts 
and prosecutors ultimately bear responsibility to vindicate victims’ 
interests. Under the CVRA, trial courts must ensure that victims are 
afforded their statutory rights.129 Government officials, including 
prosecutors, must “make their best efforts to see that crime victims 
are notified of, and accorded,” their rights under the CVRA.130 
Victims and their legal representatives may petition a district court 
and then an appellate court if they are not being accorded their 
rights.131 But the plain language of the statute requires courts and 
prosecutors to protect victims’ rights before the victim files a 
petition—the victim may petition for enforcement if courts and 
prosecutors fail their obligations. The CVRA thus turns courts and 
prosecutors into victims’ advocates. In contrast, victims only have 
indirect power to influence the system. They cannot seek party or 
 
 125. Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 126. The CVRA is the first enforceable victims’ rights statute in the federal system. 150 
CONG. REC. S4262 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
 127. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). 
 128. See United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 417 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“So far as the 
Court can divine, however, victims in this posture are not accorded formal party status, nor are 
they even accorded intervenor status as in a civil action.”). 
 129. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(1). 
 130. Id. § 3771(c)(1). 
 131. Id. §§ 3771(d)(1), (3). 
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intervenor status; only the court, prosecutors, and defendants remain 
direct participants. 
Congress could have made victims substantial participants to 
criminal proceedings. The CVRA could have made victims coparties 
with the government, like qui tam plaintiffs, or it could have created 
an intervenor posture in criminal cases, as it did in civil cases. More 
radically, Congress could have abandoned the public prosecution 
system and asked victims to prosecute criminal cases, or it could have 
made prosecutors representatives of the victim rather than the public, 
similar to plaintiffs in derivative suits. At best, by giving victims the 
right “to be heard” on limited subjects, Congress probably made 
victims little more than amici curiae. Like amici curiae, then, victims 
remain nonparties to criminal proceedings with no right to litigate the 
merits of a criminal case. 
Victims’ proponents might argue that Congress would not draft 
such a narrow statute. But the CVRA suggests why Congress created 
an enforcement provision that fundamentally gives victims very little 
power: perhaps Congress simply was unwilling to abandon the 
existing public prosecution model. By restricting victim participation 
and reaffirming prosecutorial discretion, Congress expressed its 
preference that the executive, not victims, prosecute criminal cases. 
But as the rest of this Section indicates, placing the burden instead on 
courts and prosecutors to vindicate victims’ rights may upset the basic 
structure of the federal criminal justice system. 
2. Courts.  Enforcing victims’ interests can place courts at odds 
with the parties. For example, in In re Dean,132 prosecutors were 
investigating whether to bring criminal charges against BP Products 
North America (BP) after an explosion at a refinery that BP owned 
killed fifteen people.133 The government and the district court agreed 
that given the publicity surrounding the case and the possibility of 
prejudicing BP, the government did not need to confer with the 
victims.134 Prosecutors argued that communicating with victims would 
“impair the plea negotiation process.”135 The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit held that prosecutors had to confer with victims, 
 
 132. In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
 133. Id. at 392. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. (quoting federal prosecutors). 
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although it refused to compel the trial court to reject the plea 
agreement.136 Under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, a trial court 
would have to force victim participation in plea negotiations over the 
objections of the parties and despite concerns that victim 
participation would prejudice the defendant. And by the plain terms 
of the CVRA, the court would have to do so even if the victim did not 
first object. Thus the CVRA disrupts the most fundamental division 
of responsibility in adversary litigation: it does not rely on a party to 
the litigation to vindicate that party’s rights (or even to vindicate an 
outsider’s rights on the outsider’s behalf); instead, it asks courts to 
vindicate the rights and interests of a nonparty. 
The CVRA also places courts in conflict with prosecutors’ 
statutory and constitutional discretion. The core of the Rubin case137 
was a dispute between prosecutors, who wanted to resolve the case, 
and the victims, who wanted to recover as much of their loss through 
restitution and civil damages as possible.138 Because Omni and RJP 
were not parties, they demanded that the court vindicate their 
interest in recovery at the expense of the government’s right, as a 
party, to litigate its case. The Rubin victims therefore asked the court 
to infringe an adversary party’s autonomy. And because the party was 
the government exercising an executive function, the Rubin victims 
were fundamentally asking the court to overlook prosecutors’ 
statutory and constitutional responsibilities to prosecute federal 
crimes. Federal courts, generally reluctant to interfere with 
prosecutorial discretion, have an obligation under the CVRA to 
second-guess prosecutors’ decisions on behalf of a nonparty with no 
right to adjudicate the case. 
The Rubin decision highlighted another problem for courts 
enforcing victims’ rights: victims’ interests often conflict with the 
rights and interests of the accused, placing courts in the 
uncomfortable position of vindicating a victim’s rights while the 
 
 136. Id. at 395. The appellate court stated that the trial court could decide what weight, if 
any, to give the victims’ absence from negotiations when deciding whether to accept the plea 
agreement. Id. In July 2008, the Supreme Court refused to stay enforcement of the plea 
agreement. Dean v. U.S. Dist. Court, 128 S. Ct. 2996, 2996 (2008). 
 137. See supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text. 
 138. United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 425–26 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (reporting that 
Omni and RJP argued that “the government has not provided information with which to pursue 
restitution in this case and in their civil suit” and that “the government submitted on behalf of 
victims a restitution claim . . . that significantly undervalues their loss”). 
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accused continues to enjoy the presumption of innocence.139 This duty 
clashes with a court’s responsibility to protect defendants’ rights 
during criminal proceedings.140 In Rubin, for example, the victims 
wanted the court to increase restitution over the objection of the 
prosecution and the defense.141 Their petition created two problems 
for the court. First, when asked to vindicate victims’ rights, the court 
had to assume that the victims had suffered at the hands of the 
defendant—an assumption that directly conflicts with the 
presumption of innocence.142 Second, the victims wanted the court to 
step beyond its neutrality, a core aspect of adversary judging, and 
encourage the prosecution to make the plea agreement harsher for 
the defendant. As the Rubin court aptly summarized, “[i]t is hard to 
comprehend, in any case, how a court presiding over the prosecution 
of a defendant could engage in sidebar dispute resolution between a 
victim and the government regarding the strategic decisions of the 
government about the very prosecution the Court is to try 
impartially.”143 
3. Prosecutors.  Prosecutors have an ethical responsibility to 
vindicate the public’s interest in ensuring just enforcement of the 
United States’ criminal laws.144 But the CVRA asks prosecutors to 
make their “best efforts” to enforce victims’ rights.145 Although the 
statute disclaims any infringement on prosecutorial discretion,146 it 
 
 139. One district court explained the conundrum: 
The CVRA defines a “crime victim” as “a person directly and proximately harmed as 
a result of the commission of a Federal offense or an offense in the District of 
Columbia.” At this stage of the case, however, the defendant continues to enjoy a 
presumption that he is innocent of the charge that he committed a Federal offense. 
Strictly speaking, then, I might be constrained to presume that there is no person who 
meets the definition of “crime victim” in this case. That syllogism—which renders the 
CVRA inapplicable to this or any other criminal case unless and until the defendant 
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—produces an absurd result that I must 
presume Congress did not intend. Nevertheless, I cannot ignore the possibility that by 
requiring me to afford rights to “crime victims” in this case, the CVRA may 
impermissibly infringe upon the presumption of Turner’s innocence. 
United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 325–26 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (mem.) (citation omitted) 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2006)). 
 140. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 141. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 412–13. 
 142. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 325–26. 
 143. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 427–28. 
 144. See supra Part I.B.2.a. 
 145. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1) (2006). 
 146. Id. § 3771(d)(6). 
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does give victims the “reasonable right to confer” with the 
prosecution.147 The CVRA also allows prosecutors to petition the 
district and appellate courts for relief if victims are not afforded their 
rights.148 
Representing victims’ private interests creates an ethical conflict 
for prosecutors as soon as the victims’ interests diverge from those of 
the public. In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A.,149 the 
Supreme Court discussed the conflict that prosecutors face when 
representing private interests during a criminal proceeding: 
A prosecutor may be tempted to bring a tenuously supported 
prosecution if such a course promises financial or legal rewards for 
the private client. Conversely, a prosecutor may be tempted to 
abandon a meritorious prosecution if a settlement providing benefits 
to the private client is conditioned on a recommendation against 
criminal charges.150 
Young addressed the appointment of a private attorney whose client 
had a financial stake in the outcome of the proceedings to prosecute a 
criminal contempt case.151 Although the CVRA does not make victims 
the clients of federal prosecutors, as was the situation in Young, it 
does appear to ask prosecutors to consider victims’ interests in a new 
or more significant light. And as Rubin demonstrated, victims may 
have financial interests—or even simply emotional interests—that 
drive them to demand harsher treatment of defendants than the 
prosecutor may consider wise. Had the prosecutors in Rubin assisted 
Omni and RJP with their efforts to recover their financial losses 
criminally and civilly, the prosecutors would have verged on 
committing the very improprieties the Young Court denounced. 
And like the courts, prosecutors’ ethical responsibilities include 
seeking justice for all parties, including the accused.152 For example, in 
Dean, the trial court granted an ex parte order for the government 
relieving it of its responsibilities to notify and confer with the victims 
of the BP explosion because, given the high-profile nature of the case, 
“any public notification of a potential criminal disposition resulting 
 
 147. Id. § 3771(a)(5). 
 148. Id. § 3771(d)(1). 
 149. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S. A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987). 
 150. Id. at 805. 
 151. For a discussion of the facts in the Young case, see supra note 54. 
 152. See supra Part I.B.2.a. 
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from the government’s investigation . . . would prejudice BP.”153 The 
Fifth Circuit rejected the lower court’s conclusion that ordering the 
government to disclose the existence of its investigation would 
infringe prosecutorial discretion.154 But the Fifth Circuit did not 
address the ethical problem prosecutors faced—by acting cautiously 
to protect BP’s rights, the government was fulfilling its duty to the 
public interest. When prosecutors place the rights of victims, who are 
not even parties to the litigation, before the rights of defendants, who 
enjoy substantial constitutional protections, they appear to violate—
or at least undermine—their ethical duty to defendants. 
Because the CVRA does not infringe or modify prosecutors’ 
statutory and constitutional duties to enforce criminal law, the statute 
forces prosecutors to vindicate victim’s interests while representing 
the government’s interests—even if they conflict. None of the devices 
discussed in Part II.C asked a party to litigate interests that conflicted 
with its own goals. Unless the CVRA is nothing more than a 
reminder that prosecutors should consider victims’ interests when 
deciding how the government should proceed,155 it is an 
unprecedented infringement of party autonomy and prosecutorial 
discretion. 
4. Defendants.  Finally, the CVRA places defendants in the 
difficult position of combating a nonparty whose interests are 
generally opposed to their own. For example, in United States v. 
Tobin,156 the New Hampshire Democratic Party (NHDP) claimed that 
it was a victim of the defendant’s efforts to jam phone lines set up to 
facilitate NHDP’s “get out the vote” campaign.157 The government 
and defense jointly moved to continue the trial until December, 
2005158—after November elections. The NHDP argued that the 
extension violated its rights under the CVRA and asked the court to 
 
 153. In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., No. H-07-434, 2008 WL 501321, at *2 (S.D. 
Tex. Feb. 21, 2008)). 
 154. Id. 
 155. For a discussion of how prosecutors may consider victims’ interests, see supra Part 
I.B.2.a. 
 156. United States v. Tobin, No. 04-cr-216-01-SM (D.N.H. July 22, 2005). 
 157. Id. at 2. 
 158. Id. at 1.  
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reject the extension.159 The court observed that it could not “deprive 
either criminal defendants or the government of a full an [sic] 
adequate opportunity to prepare for trial. The defendant’s right to 
adequate preparation is, of course, of constitutional significance as 
well.”160 The court prioritized the parties’ rights over the victim’s 
desire to proceed to trial prior to election day. But under the CVRA, 
which grants victims both the right to proceedings free from 
unreasonable delay161 and quasi–due process rights,162 courts could 
accelerate proceedings to the detriment of the defendant’s right to 
prepare a case. 
This posture conflicts with the defendant’s position as an 
adversary to the government, which even the Bill of Rights recognizes 
as a particularly delicate position.163 Although prosecutors have an 
ethical responsibility to defendants, the courts remain primarily 
responsible for protecting defendants’ statutory and constitutional 
rights during criminal proceedings.164 And because the CVRA does 
not make victims parties to the proceedings, courts must step in and 
represent victims’ interests even when they conflict with defendants’ 
interests. But courts are not litigants—they are responsible for ruling 
on legal questions, including whether the government’s conduct has 
violated the defendant’s constitutional rights. Defendants therefore 
have no way to challenge the court’s representation of the victims’ 
interests during the proceedings. The CVRA therefore not only 
conflicts with courts’ responsibilities to protect defendants’ rights; it 
also makes the court, responsible for ensuring fairness to both parties, 
the adversary of the defendant. 
C. Interpreting the CVRA 
Congress may have tried to protect prosecutorial discretion by 
refusing to confer party status on victims, but it created other 
problems for courts and prosecutors by forcing them to advocate for 
victims’ interests. This Section argues that a careful, narrow reading 
of the CVRA’s rights provisions could avoid many of these conflicts. 
 
 159. Id. at 2. 
 160. Id. at 4. 
 161. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(7) (2006). 
 162. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 163. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 164. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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This Section presents six165 statutory provisions that could either give 
the victim a substantial voice in prosecutions or simply ask courts and 
prosecutors to show courtesy toward victims without changing their 
decisionmaking processes. Courts should adopt this narrower reading 
to preserve the public prosecution model that Congress refused to 
abandon. 
First, the provision giving victims the right “to be treated with 
fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy” could 
justify giving victims broad rights to influence many stages of the 
criminal prosecution.166 The CVRA’s drafters asked courts and 
prosecutors to read this right expansively.167 The drafters explained 
that “[t]he broad rights articulated in this section are meant to be 
rights themselves and are not intended to just be aspirational,” and 
they argued that “the right to be treated with fairness” includes “the 
notion of due process,” but they did not explain how they intended 
the right to operate in practice.168 As some commentators have 
already contended, loose language like “fairness” and “respect” could 
confer sweeping new rights throughout the federal criminal justice 
system.169 
But this right also could simply ask courts and prosecutors to 
show consideration to victims as long as doing so does not come at 
 
 165. This Section does not discuss a victim’s right to notification of public proceedings, 18 
U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2), and not to be excluded from public proceedings, id. § 3771(a)(3), because 
those rights are relatively straightforward and present fewer ethical problems for courts and 
prosecutors. 
 166. Id. § 3771(a)(8). 
 167. Senator Kyl argued that “[i]t is not the intent of this bill that its significance be whittled 
down or marginalized by the courts or the executive branch.” 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. 
Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 168. Id. at S4269 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl); see also id. (statement of 
Sen. Feinstein) (agreeing with Senator Kyl). 
 169. For example, Professor Paul Cassell has argued that 
[t]he CVRA requires fundamental changes in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The CVRA makes crime victims participants in the criminal justice 
process and commands in sweeping terms that the courts must treat victims “with 
fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy.” To faithfully 
implement that directive, it is necessary to assess each of the existing rules against a 
fairness standard and then make changes and additions where the Rules do not 
guarantee fair treatment to victims. 
Cassell, supra note 11, at 872 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C.  
§ 3771(a)(8)). 
BLONDEL.DOC 10/31/2008  1:18:34 PM 
2008] VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 267 
 
the expense of the participants’ rights and duties.170 This 
interpretation would make more sense in light of the CVRA’s failure 
to create anything approaching party status for victims.171 If Congress 
wanted to preserve prosecutorial discretion but also incorporate 
victims into the system,172 perhaps reading this right as a reminder to 
courts and prosecutors that they should treat victims thoughtfully best 
reflects the compromise that led to the statute’s enactment. 
Another potentially groundbreaking provision grants victims 
“[t]he right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay,”173 
recognizing that victims have an interest in rapid proceedings 
independent from prosecutors and the accused. The CVRA’s drafters 
claimed that this provision “does not curtail the government’s need 
for reasonable time to organize and prosecute its case” or “infringe 
on the defendant’s due process right to prepare a defense.”174 Instead, 
this right was intended to require courts to reject motions to continue 
proceedings made only for the convenience of the parties that go 
beyond either party’s need to prepare.175 The statute provides no 
further guidance explaining when proceedings are unreasonably 
delayed. 
Courts could read this statute strictly and accelerate the case 
over the objection of the parties, or courts could rely on the drafters’ 
acknowledgement that the parties have a right to fully prepare their 
cases and rarely, if ever, hasten the proceedings on the victim’s 
behalf.176 To avoid interfering with the parties’ rights to choose how to 
litigate their cases, courts should follow the latter approach. The 
CVRA does not make victims parties, and so victims should not have 
 
 170. See, e.g., United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 427–28 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (refusing 
to “prohibit[] the government from raising legitimate arguments in support of its opposition to a 
motion simply because the arguments may hurt a victim’s feelings or reputation”). 
 171. See supra Part III.B.1.  
 172. See supra Parts III.A–B. 
 173. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(7). The purpose of this provision was to vindicate the victim’s 
interest in repose. See 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) 
(“It is not right to hold crime victims under the stress and pressure of future court proceedings 
merely because it is convenient for the parties or the court.”). 
 174. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 175. Id. 
 176. See United States v. Tobin, No. 04-cr-216-01-SM, slip op. at 4 (D.N.H. July 22, 2005) 
(“Although the [victim’s] interest in having this case proceed forthwith is important, of equal 
importance is the court’s duty to ensure that both the defendant and government receive due 
process and a fair trial.”). 
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a real voice in determining the pace of litigation; nor should courts 
represent that voice against the government and the accused. One 
court observed, 
This litigation may be proceeding with less speed than the [victim] 
would prefer, given its own discrete interests, but it is worthwhile to 
reflect on the old adage that the wheels of justice grind slowly, but 
they grind exceedingly fine. The alternative – precipitous spinning of 
the powerful wheels of justice merely to satisfy popular demand –
runs the unacceptable risk of those wheels running over the rights of 
both the accused and the government, and in the end, the people 
themselves.177 
The victim’s “reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the 
Government in the case”178 also may threaten the government’s 
autonomy. Although the CVRA preserves prosecutorial discretion, 
this provision has led many victims to ask courts to reject plea 
agreements or vacate guilty pleas on the ground that the victims did 
not sufficiently confer with the prosecution regarding the plea.179 
Confronted with this situation, the Fifth Circuit proposed reading the 
statute to ask prosecutors to converse with victims “before ultimately 
exercising [their] broad discretion.”180 Although the CVRA’s drafters 
claimed that “[t]his right is intended to be expansive,”181 the Fifth 
Circuit’s interpretation conforms to the drafters’ floor statements on 
the issue.182 By asking prosecutors to communicate with victims 
without necessarily changing their decisionmaking based on the 
victim’s interests, the Fifth Circuit’s approach avoids forcing 
prosecutors to represent conflicting interests and avoids placing 
courts in the awkward position of second-guessing prosecutors’ 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5). 
 179. E.g., In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394–95 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
 180. Id. at 395. The Fifth Circuit decided that the district court should not have exempted 
prosecutors from this requirement, but it concluded that the injury to victims was not sufficient 
to warrant mandamus relief. Id. 
 181. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl); 150 CONG. 
REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
 182. Senator Feinstein explained that this right is expansive in the sense that it applies at 
“any critical stage or disposition of the case.” 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) 
(statement of Sen. Feinstein). Prosecutors merely “should consider it part of their profession to 
be available to consult with crime victims about concerns the victims may have which are 
pertinent to the case, case proceedings or dispositions.” Id. at S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) 
(statement of Sen. Kyl). 
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decisions. This provision should encourage prosecutors to act 
courteously toward victims while continuing to represent the United 
States’ interests. 
Some CVRA provisions ultimately reinforce existing law without 
creating new rights. “The right to be reasonably protected from the 
accused”183 is a particularly ambiguous provision. Although even 
Senator Kyl recognized that “the government cannot protect the 
crime victim in all circumstances,” he did not explain in what 
circumstances the right should apply.184 Victims could demand federal 
protection based on this provision. The Rubin victims argued that 
because the government investigated, arrested, and placed Rubin on 
bond while he was defrauding them, Omni and RJP were denied their 
rights under this provision.185 But the Rubin court found a limiting 
principle in the statutory text: it concluded that because Rubin had 
not been “accused” of defrauding Omni and RJP at that time, they 
had no rights under the CVRA “beyond that of general law to be 
protected from criminal conduct by Rubin or anyone else.”186 
Even once the defendant is formally charged, however, it is not 
clear what responsibilities this provision creates. The CVRA’s 
drafters argued it requires protection for victims when courts place 
defendants on release.187 Yet existing federal release law already 
considers victim safety, and so this provision does not appear to 
contribute new rights.188 Courts could grant release less often or with 
harsher terms based on this right, particularly if they considered it 
with the victim’s right to be heard on the issue of release.189 But the 
CVRA’s plain text does not require them to do so, and forcing a court 
to change its decision about whether to grant freedom to the accused 
based on the interests of a nonparty would conflict with the court’s 
 
 183. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1). 
 184. 150 CONG. REC. S10,910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 185. United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).  
 186. Id. at 420. 
 187. 150 CONG. REC. S10,910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 188. One district court interpreting the CVRA observed as much: 
Regardless of what this right might entail outside the bail context, it appears to add 
no new substance to the protection of crime victims afforded by the Bail Reform Act, 
which already allows a court to order reasonable conditions of release or the 
detention of an accused defendant to “assure . . . the safety of any other person.” 
United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 332 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (mem.) (alteration in 
original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1) (2000)). 
 189. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (2006). 
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role as protector of a defendant’s rights. The drafters’ other 
statements about this provision counsel a more limited reading. Aside 
from the release issue, Senator Kyl simply asked courts to reasonably 
“provide[] accommodations such as a secure waiting area, away from 
the defendant.”190 Senator Kyl appears to ask courts to be courteous. 
This reading allows courts to remain impartial, particularly toward 
the defendant, and it prevents imposing on courts general 
responsibility to ensure that federal law enforcement and federal 
prosecutors are providing protection for victims. 
Another provision that fundamentally restates existing law is 
“[t]he right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.”191 The 
CVRA’s drafters endorsed a definition of restitution that includes 
compensating the victim’s family for the victim’s lost future income in 
homicide cases.192 This provision contributes to criminal proceedings, 
then, by clarifying existing law.193 But because the CVRA recognizes 
the right to restitution “as provided in law,”194 courts uniformly have 
concluded that the CVRA does not change victims’ access to 
restitution.195 
Many of these interpretations appear to give victims no real right 
to participate in the proceedings, which the CVRA’s drafters claimed 
was the statute’s purpose.196 But one provision could give victims an 
opportunity to participate without upsetting the role of the court or 
the rights of the parties. The CVRA gives victims the right to be 
“reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court 
 
 190. 150 CONG. REC. S10,910 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 191. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6). 
 192. See 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (endorsing 
two decisions by Judge Cassell, then on the District Court of Utah, that interpreted federal 
restitution statutes to include lost future income). 
 193. See United States v. Bedonie, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1302–04 (D. Utah. 2004) (mem.) 
(interpreting the language and legislative intent of existing federal restitution statutes to 
authorize lost income restitution in homicide cases). 
 194. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6). 
 195. E.g., In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co., 409 F.3d 555, 563–64 (2d Cir. 2005) (affirming 
the establishment of a restitution fund that did not fully compensate all victims because the 
Mandatory Victim Restitution Act allows courts to limit restitution when the number of victims 
makes full compensation difficult); United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 871–72, 875 (S.D. 
Tex. 2006) (mem.) (concluding that the CVRA could not overcome the abatement doctrine, 
which required vacation of Kenneth Lay’s conviction because he could not appeal his conviction 
after his death). 
 196. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text. 
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involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.”197 
Senator Kyl argued that it makes victims “independent participant[s]” 
and ensures that they may give victim impact statements.198 Federal 
statues already permit victim impact evidence during some sentencing 
proceedings,199 and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow 
victims of violent or sexual crimes to address the court.200 But the 
CVRA appears to be the first federal statute to confer a general right 
on victims of all federal crimes to speak to the court at sentencing,201 
expanding the role of controversial victim impact evidence in federal 
criminal proceedings.202 
The CVRA does not explain how much weight, if any, courts 
should give victims’ opinions. Courts could use this provision to 
justify imposing harsher release terms or sentences. On the other 
hand, as the Sixth Circuit observed, it is not clear “why the particular 
desires of [the] victim should affect the legal analysis necessary for 
sentencing” the defendant.203 Courts could treat victims essentially 
like amici curiae, because, like amici curiae, victims have no clear 
 
 197. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4). 
 198. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 199. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2319A(d) (2006) (copyright infringement); 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (2006) 
(capital sentencing). 
 200. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(B). 
 201. Lower courts disagree whether the CVRA gives victims the right to speak or to simply 
present their perspective in writing. Compare United States v. Marcello, 370 F. Supp. 2d 745, 
748 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (mem.) (“[T]he statute requires only that a victim be reasonably heard, 
and . . . Congress’s use of that term of art does not require that a trial court accept oral 
statements in all situations.”), with Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 
2006) (“The statements of the sponsors of the CVRA and the committee report for the 
proposed constitutional amendment disclose a clear congressional intent to give crime victims 
the right to speak at proceedings covered by the CVRA.”). The CVRA’s drafters, however, 
intended for victims to have the right to speak. 150 CONG. REC. S10,911 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 2004) 
(statement of Sen. Kyl); 150 CONG. REC. S4268 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Feinstein). 
 202. Many commentators have criticized victim impact evidence as inflammatory and 
prejudicial. E.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 361, 395 (1996) (“Victim impact statements evoke . . . a complex set of emotions directed 
toward the defendant, including hatred, fear, racial animus, vindictiveness, undifferentiated 
vengeance, and the desire to purge collective anger.” (footnote omitted)); Janice Nadler & 
Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact Testimony and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 419, 426 (2003) (arguing that victim impact evidence “diverts the jury’s attention away 
from the crime and the defendant and toward the character of the victim and the crime’s effect 
on his family”). 
 203. United States v. Hughes, No. 06-6461, 2008 WL 2604249, at *7 n.7 (6th Cir. June 26, 
2008). 
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statutory right to have their arguments considered. Victims still could 
have the satisfaction of expressing their feelings without necessarily 
affecting the court’s decisionmaking, avoiding conflicts for the judges 
and prosecutors who otherwise would have to treat the defendant 
more harshly. And if Congress has not given victims the right to 
adjudicate their interest in harsher treatment of defendants, then 
courts should not use vague language about a right to be heard to 
create it. 
Some might object that interpreting the CVRA this narrowly 
eviscerates the statute. But this reading still requires the federal 
justice system to incorporate victims; it simply avoids making them 
independent parties. After the CVRA, victims may express their 
opinions to prosecutors and, during some proceedings, to the court.204 
The CVRA also makes it more difficult for courts to exclude victims 
from public court proceedings,205 and it requires prosecutors to notify 
victims of those public proceedings in advance.206 In short, the CVRA 
allows victims to witness some proceedings, talk to prosecutors, and 
communicate with the court. These rights still respect victims’ unique 
investment in the proceedings. But narrowly interpreting the CVRA 
makes sense in light of Congress’s refusal to replace the public-
prosecution model. Limiting victims’ influence over the prosecution 
matches their lack of formal party status, and it generally avoids many 
problems that forcing courts and prosecutors to advocate for crime 
victims creates. If Congress wishes to make victims parties, it may do 
so. Until then, courts should tread carefully before reading the 
CVRA too broadly. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note probes whether some ends justify the means necessary 
to achieve them. Victims’ rights scholars have argued, with 
considerable political success, that it is worth changing the means of 
criminal justice—the traditional adversary process between the 
 
 204. See supra notes 178–82, 196–202 and accompanying text. 
 205. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(3) (2006) (requiring courts to find, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that a victim’s presence at a public proceeding would “materially alter[]” the victim’s 
testimony before excluding the victim from the courtroom). This provision contrasts with the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, which generally allow courts total discretion to exclude witnesses 
from the courtroom. FED. R. EVID. 615. 
 206. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2). 
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government and the defendant—to promote the victim’s well-being. 
Their arguments echo an old debate among legal scholars about the 
adversary system’s effect on third-party interests. It also probes one 
of the most vexing problems of criminal justice: with so much at stake, 
why not manipulate procedure to ensure a better outcome for victims, 
defendants, or the public at large? 
But valuing the right result over the right process has 
consequences. Because American law continues to follow the 
adversary tradition, promoting essentially inquisitorial values 
undermines the way American procedure actually operates. The 
CVRA’s potential effect on the federal criminal justice system 
illustrates this problem. It places courts in the awkward position of 
second-guessing prosecutorial discretion and vindicating victims’ 
interests against the rights of criminal defendants. Prosecutors also 
must represent victims in criminal proceedings, undermining 
prosecutors’ traditional role as ministers of justice and forcing them 
to vindicate interests that may conflict with the government’s own. 
And defendants rely on courts and, to a lesser extent, prosecutors to 
protect their constitutional rights, a protection that the CVRA may 
enervate. 
American law has developed a number of solutions for the 
conflict between the adversary process and third-party interests. 
Some devices, like the amicus curiae devices, allow third parties to 
present their position without giving third parties power to vindicate 
their rights vis-à-vis the real parties. Otherwise, American law has 
either conferred some kind of party or intervenor status on third 
parties or asked a litigant to stand in the third party’s shoes before the 
court. None of the devices presented in this Note requires the court to 
vindicate the interests of nonparties or forces litigants to represent 
interests contrary to their own. 
The CVRA does not confer party or intervenor status on crime 
victims. Despite some pro-victim rhetoric, Congress explicitly 
preserved the public-prosecution model and claimed that the statute 
did not affect defendants’ rights. In short, even Congress was 
unwilling to change the fundamental structure of the justice system to 
promote victims’ interests. Both victims’ nonparty status and the 
limited nature of many of the CVRA’s substantive rights demonstrate 
Congress’s reluctance to upset the status quo. 
This Note proposes a way to interpret the CVRA that remains 
true to the statute’s text and generally avoids disrupting the basic 
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structure of the federal adversary process. Rather than conferring 
broad rights on crime victims, courts and others should simply show 
courtesy and respect toward crime victims. They should allow victims 
to attend public proceedings and share their thoughts. They should 
communicate with victims and remember them when release or 
restitution law requires it. But courts and prosecutors should not 
change their decisionmaking for victims. By observing this distinction, 
they can implement the statute that Congress crafted and the justice 
system demands. 
 
